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I
I will start by highlighting two motifs in Grice’s project which have decisively
contributed to shape contemporary studies about language and, especially, the discipline
of linguistic pragmatics (cf. Frapolli & Villanueva, 2007). The first one may be labeled
intentional motif, for it involves understanding nonnatural meaning (or meaningnn) as a
function of speakers’ intentions. This insight is already outlined in his 1957 classical
paper on «Meaning»:
«A meantnn something by x» is (roughly) equivalent to «A intended the utterance of x to
produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention». (Grice,
1989, p. 220)
By appeal to a specific class of communicative intentions, Grice introduces the
notion of speaker’s meaning, which constitutes the most basic instance of meaningnn.
Other semantic notions, in particular the meaning of linguistic expressions, are in turns
construed in terms of speaker’s meaning. This explanatory order is at the core of what
Grice will later present, in his «Retrospective Epilogue», as the «fourth thematic strand»
recurring in his work, and may be summarized in the idea that «what words mean is a
matter of what people mean by them» (1989, p. 340).
According to Grice, primary cases of meaningnn involve the performance of an
action by the speaker. The episodes of speaker’s meaning are a type of intentional action
consisting in the utterance of a linguistic expression. This is reflected in the form of the
analisandum that Grice undertakes:
By doing x, the speaker meant ‘__’.
The second motif I want to focus on is Grice’s concern for identifying «a central or
primary range of cases of signification» which may «offer itself as a core around which
more peripherical cases of signification might cluster, perhaps in dependent posture»
(1989, p. 359). This motif, which Grice himself brings under the head of centrality,
points toward a differentiation of levels of meaning. Thus, any utterance may be
assigned a central speaker’s meaning, which must be carefully distinguished from any
other layers of information that the utterance may be considered to convey –e.g. what the
utterer indicates, presupposes, hints, etc. This distinction is seen in terms of speech acts.
Grice suggests that «speakers may be at one and the same time engaged in performing
speech-acts at different but related levels» (1989, p. 362), which result in different levels
of (speaker’s) meaning. Accordingly, Grice picks out a central speech act, saying, which
corresponds with a basic level or stratum of speaker’s meaning, what is said.
In “Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions” Grice provides a canonical definition of this
central speech act. “U (utterer) said that p” is analyzed as:
U did something x (1) by which U centrally meant that p
(2) which is an occurrence of a type S part of the 
meaning of which is ‘p’. (Grice, 1989, p. 88)
Although the adverb ‘centrally’ occurs in condition (1) of the analisans, an essential
feature of centrality concerns condition (2). The above formulation of this condition is
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the last step in a series of tentative approaches. First, Grice considers «(2) [x] is a type
which means ‘p’», and parenthetically comments, «that is, has for some person or other
an established standard or conventional meaning» (1989, p. 87). Right after, Grice adds,
«[w]e want doing x to be a linguistic act», so he decides to include in the analisans the
notion of a linguistic system –a specific kind of conventional device. This produces, in
abbreviated form, «(2) [x] is an occurrence of a type S which means ‘p’ in some
linguistic system». The clause «in some linguistic system» does not occur, but is
understood, in the definitive formulation. now, conventionality –or for Grice also,
formality– is one of the two features that he takes into account as possible criteria of
centrality in «Retrospective Epilogue»:
One class of cases of significance with a seemingly good claim to centrality would be
those in which the items or situations signified are picked out as such by their falling under
the conventional meaning of the signifying expression rather than by some more informal
or indirect relationship to the signifying expression. (Grice, 1989, p. 360)
The adverb ‘centrally’ in condition (1) alludes to the other feature, which Grice later
terms, in «Retrospective Epilogue», dictiveness (cf. Latin ‘dictio’). The «dictive
content» of an utterance is that part of its meaning which is relevant to evaluate the truth
of the utterance. The notion of dictiveness makes it possible to identify that «ground-
floor» or primary speech act –saying– in contrast with which, other speech acts,
nonprimary ones, can be distinguished.
[A] special centrality should be attributed to those instances of signification in which what
is signified either is, or forms part of, or is specially and appropriately connected with what
the signifying expression (or its user) says as distinct from implies, suggest, hints, or in
some other less than fully direct manner conveys. (1989, p. 360)
In virtue of dictiveness, a speaker cannot be imputed to have said anything beyond
the truth-conditions of the uttered sentence.
Grice tends to privilege dictiveness as the mark of centrality, since there are
«elements in the conventional meaning of an utterance which are not part of what has
been said» (1989, p. 122), and which are better accounted for in terms of conventional
implicatures –as in the well-known examples «Sue is poor but honest», and «He is an
Englishman; he is, therefore, brave». In any case, however, both dictiveness and
formality are essential to the central act of saying, as the above definition, or this
alternative one –occurring in «Utterer’s Meaning, Sentece-Meaning and Word-
Meaning»–, makes it clear:
[I]n uttering X, U will have said that *p, if both (i) U has Y-ed that *p, where Y-ing is a
central speech act, and (ii) X embodies some conventional device the meaning of which is
such that its presence in X indicates that its utterer is Y-ing that *p. (1989, p. 121; my
italics)
Grice acknowledges that the sense of ‘saying’ he favors is «in some degree artificial»
(1989, p. 118). He declares that «[m]y primary reason for opting for this particular sense
of ‘say’ is that I expect it to be of greater theoretical utility than some other sense of ‘say’
would be» (1989, p. 121). Indeed, the contrast between what is said, in Grice’s sense,
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and other levels of speaker’s meaning –like, especially, different types of implicature–
constitutes the cornerstone of his approach to conversation, and therefore, of his theory
of linguistic communication. This theory has proven to be enormously fruitful in
detecting, and dealing with, a huge variety of phenomena that was hardly accessible for
previous approaches.
However, some philosophers –Sellars among them– see the intentional motif which
is at the basis of Grice’s project as an onerous burden, that we should dispense with. The
question I want to raise in this paper is whether we can benefit from the positive insights
that Grice’s theory of communication and his most operative notions provide, without
thereby committing ourselves to the priority of mental intentionality. By distinguishing
two motifs within Grice’s project, I have cleared up the ground for a positive answer. In
the following two sections I will be arguing that in Sellars’ work we can find both a line
of criticism against Grice’s intentional strategy (§II), and a seminal notion of saying
which, being alternative to Grice’s, can be claimed to instantiate the two features of
centrality that are involved in his notion of saying (§III).
II
Sellars mentions Grice in an illuminating context, in the course of his reply to the
objections Putnam addresses to MFC. Sellars writes: 
I have always stressed that language is a social institution, and that meaning is to be
construed in social terms. […] What a speaker’s words mean (to use a less ambiguous
expression which has the additional advantage of pointing away from Gricean labyrinths)
is no more to be defined in terms of his beliefs and purposes than is, for example, the legal
significance of his actions (RDP, p. 460).
This passage reveals Sellars’ opinions about the Gricean explanations. However,
when Sellars criticizes in depth the views that could be attributed to Grice, the latter is
not mentioned. In LTC (p. 510n. 2) Sellars does refer generally to «John Austin and his
students», and charged them with an approach to language according to which all
linguistic activity would consist of actions performed by the speakers. This approach
would be a result of overemphasizing the communicative function of language, as Sellars
remarks in another work:
[1] [A] source of misunderstanding of the nature of meaning is the current stress on
language as a means of communication, an emphasis which has led many
philosophers to see language in the perspective of action-theory. Utterances are
construed as actions which, when successful, realize intentions that hearers
acquire beliefs. An attempt is then made to construe the meaning of linguistic
items in terms of the conceptual content of the standard intentions and beliefs
which are involved in the acts of communication in which these items are
deployed. (nAO, V, §4)
I will soon come back to Sellars’ treatment of what he calls «the paradigm of action»,
since the reasons for his criticism are closely related to his own program for approaching
language. Firstly, it is worth showing that, in the above quotation, crucial aspects of
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Grice’s view are at stake. To that effect, I will pay some attention to Grice’s paper
«Meaning Revisited», where he offers a general sketch of his account of language in
terms of mental intentionality. He writes: «The first of the three correspondences which
one might expect to find when thinking in largish terms about the relationships between
reality, thought, and language or communication device, is a correspondence between
thought and reality» (Grice, 1989, p. 284). nonnatural meaning may have emerged,
Grice suggests, as a gradual development of biological devices of natural meaning.
Communication by conventional means, linguistic activity in particular, would have
evolved from natural expressions of psychological states, such as shouts of pain. Grice
describes a step-by-step sophistication of the relevant states: even before becoming full-
fledged speakers, creatures could have purposes and intentions, recognize their pairs’
intentions, and even attribute truthfulness and responsibility to them (1989, p. 294).
Thus, starting from a wide range of contentful psychological states –postulated by the
theorist in order to explain how the creatures’ behavior coordinates with physical
environment–, communication is conceived as the expression of those states and its
reproduction in other creatures; therefore, as a second correspondence within the
«triangle consisting of reality, thought, and language or communication devices» (1989,
p. 286).
[P]sychological states which initially attach to one creature can be transmitted or
transferred or reproduced in another creature (a process which might be called ψ-
transmission) [...]. Obviously, the production of communication devices is a resource
which will help to effect such transfers. [/] If one accepts this idea, then one could simply
accept that for the process to be intelligible [...] there will have to be correspondences
between particular communication devices or utterances on the one hand, and
psychological states on the other. (1989, p. 286f)
In favorable cases of communication, the hearer reproduces the psychological state
that the speaker intended to transmit. Moreover, the recovery of that state –that is, a state
with the same content– constitutes the success of the communicative episode. Language,
as a system of conventions, plays an instrumental role in the reproductive process of
communication: it is a device deployed by the speakers to realize their communicative
intentions.
Grice’s outline perpetuates a traditional point of view about the relations between
world, thought, and language, the criticism of which in EPM (§§47, 50) is part and
parcel of Sellars’ campaign against the «Myth of the Given». The key of this «classical
view» consists in analyzing the meaning of linguistic utterances in terms of the
intentionality of thought, according to this schema:
«‘…’ means p» is to be analyzed as «‘…’ expresses t, and t is about p». (ITM, p. 534)
Here the notion of meaning that occurs in the analisandum is explicated as a unique
relation resulting from other two relations involved in the analisans: an expressive
relation between language and thought, and a previous relation of intentionality or
aboutness between thought and world. These three relations institute the «triangle» of
«correspondences» Grice deals with.
Already in EPM, under the figure of the «Myth of Jones» (§§53-59), Sellars
adumbrates an opposed theoretical program, in which the semantic categories that apply
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directly to language are taken to be primitive and serve as the model for understanding
the intentionality of mental episodes. An essential element in this alternative view is a
nonrelational analysis of the notion of meaning and, in particular, of mean-
statements –sentences of the form «‘…’ means p». Another ingredient consists in
according priority to the role that language plays as a medium of thought over its
instrumental role in communication, which leads to the idea that learning the language
amounts to acquiring conceptual capacities. These pieces, which Sellars shapes in
various essays of the 1950s, fit together in LTC.1 It is here where Sellars presents, as an
alternative to the dominant intentional approach to language, «a linguistic approach to
conceptual abilities» (LTC, p. 510), and where he explicitly states the theoretical
program I have been referring to, that is «a program according to which (a) linguistic
activity is, in a primary sense, conceptual activity; (b) linguistic activity is through and
through rule-governed» (LTC, p. 510).
The two parts, (a) and (b), of this program, which I will call Sellars’ program –or just
the program–, can be thought of as setting adequacy conditions for any philosophically
sound theory of language. According to (a), the theory has to account for the conceptual
import of linguistic activity. It is important to note that the claim involved in (a) is a
strong, two-directional one: not only must linguistic activity be considered conceptual
activity; conceptual activity must be understood as consisting of linguistic activity in the
very first place. Sellars, thus, sees language as «the bearer of conceptual activity» (LCT,
p. 511), «the very medium in which we think» (MFC, p. 417). This is the fundamental
function of language, which underlies its instrumental function in communication and in
the performance of speech acts. Inverting this order of functions is to «run the risk of
getting things upside down» (nAO, V, §§6, 24).
Part (b) of the program articulates the general idea that linguistic practice –and
therefore, in the light of (a), concept-application– is a normative activity, which takes
place against a social background of sanctions and public criteria of correction. The
strong reading of (a) determines how the rules involved in that activity must be rendered,
for it makes (b) to be interchangeable with the following (b’), «conceptual activity is
through and through rule-governed». If the theory aims to explain «what is to have
concepts in terms of rules of language» (LTC, p. 510), it must devise a kind of rules that
do not imply the possession of concepts by the subjects to which the rules in question
are supposed to apply.
To this effect –and at least since SRLG–, Sellars distinguishes two types of rules,
which he terms, respectively, rules of action (or ought-to-dos) and rules of criticism
(ought-to-bes). The first have the form:
If one is in C, ought to do A (LTC, p. 507),
where C denotes a set of circumstances, and A a specific action. The subject to which
this type of rule applies will also be, in case of being in C, the subject of the action A.
Consequently, he or she has to be an agent, able to act accordingly to the rule, and able
as well to recognize that the circumstances C obtain. In short, the subject must have «the
concepts of doing A and being in C» (LTC, p. 508). Rules of criticism, in contrast, have
the form:
1 A proximate antecedent can be found in chapter III of SM (see specially §§25-41).
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Xs ought to be in state φ, whenever such and such is the case. (LTC, p. 507)
Here, the subjects of the rule, the Xs, do not have to possess any concept –in
particular, the concepts of being in φ and such and such being the case. The Xs in
question may even be inanimate objects, like in the following example:
Clock chimes ought to strike on the quarter hour. (LTC, p. 507)
Since the subject of an ought-to-do rule needs to have the concepts involved in its
formulation, if we want to carry out part (a) of Sellars’ program, we must assume that at
least many of the rules governing linguistic activity –part (b)– are of the second type,
that is, ought-to-bes. Sellars’ stance is that speakers acquire, at once, language and
conceptual abilities by conforming their behavior to ought-to-be rules. The first grade of
linguistic and conceptual activity is made of episodes that do not consist in obeying rules
of action, but rather exemplify rules of criticism. «The language learner», Sellars says,
«begins by conforming to these rules without grasping them himself.» (MFC, p. 422)
Thus, the first form of rule-governed behavior consists of episodes patterned by rules.
In the acquisition of this kind of pattern-governed behavior by the language-learners,
adult speakers, who already have concepts and can obey ought-to-do rules, play an
essential correcting role. This mediation is illuminated by the fact that, in general, as
Sellars remarks, «ought-to-bes imply ought-to-dos» (LTC, p. 508); so, to take back the
above example, the ought-to-be rule «Clock chimes ought to strike on the quarter hour»,
implies an ought-to-do like:
(Other things being equal and where possible) one ought to bring it about that clock
chimes strike on the quarter hour. (LTC, p. 508)
Likewise, in the domain of language, every semantic ought-to-be rule implies an
ought-to-do rule –let’s call it «pedagogic»– which applies to the adults responsible for
introducing the child in the conceptual life of the community. «Linguistic ought-to-bes
are translated into uniformities by training.» (LTC, p. 512) The resulting picture is one
in which «[t]rainees conform to ought-to-bes because trainers obey corresponding
ought-to-dos» (MFC, p. 423). The apprentice’s behavior exhibits the following ought-
to-be,
(Ceteris paribus) one ought to respond to red objects in sunlight by uttering or being
disposed to utter ‘this is red’ (LTC, p. 511),
because competent adults obey a pedagogic ought-to-do like this,
One ought to bring it about (ceteris paribus) that people respond to red objects in sunlight
by uttering or being disposed to utter ‘this is red’ (LTC, p. 512),
in virtue of which they selectively reinforce the desired pattern of behavior in the child.
This division of labor justifies Sellars’ claim that «[a]s Wittgenstein has stressed, it is the
linguistic community as a self-perpetuating whole which is the minimum unit in terms
of which conceptual activity can be understood» (LTC, p. 512).
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Let us go back now to Sellars’ mention of «John Austin and his students», which I
left pending at the beginning of this section. We saw that, on Sellars’ view –in quotation
[1]–, overemphasizing the communicative function of language leads to approach
linguistic activity from the paradigm of action. We can now see how this paradigm
entails a commitment with the existence of a nonlinguistic level of conceptual activity.
Certainly, if we assimilate linguistic activity to a repertoire of actions, then, even
adhering part (b) of the program, we cannot account for (a) –and therefore, for (b’). For,
in that case, the rules governing linguistic activity will be all ought-to-dos, and the
participants in that activity will have to possess previously the concepts involved in the
formulation of the rules. This will prevent us from explaining the possession and
application of concepts in terms of rules of language. And this, in turns, will force us to
accept a nonlinguistic and so non rule-governed, level of conceptualization. The
paradigm of action bears a one-sided perspective over rules and entails a sort of
inversion of Sellars’ program:
[T]o approach language in terms of the paradigm of action is to make a commitment
which, if the concept of action is taken seriously, and the concept of rule is taken seriously,
leads to (a) the Cartesian idea of linguistic episodes as essentially the sort of thing brought
about by an agent whose conceptualizing is not linguistic; (b) an inability to understand
the rule-governed character of this conceptualizing itself, as contrasted with its overt
expression. (LTC, p. 510)
In RM and MFC Sellars presents this Cartesian idea as the inescapable conclusion of
two premises. The first condenses in a claim the tendency of the paradigm of action. The
second is a truism that Sellars not only embraces, but takes as a basis for his own
approach to conceptual activity: 
[2] Obviously not all thoughts are actions. Indeed such central kinds of thoughts as
perceptual takings, inferences, and volitions are not actions for the simple reason
that they are not the sort of thing that can be done intentionally or that one can
decide to do. (RM, p. 122; MFC, p. 420; cf. SM, III, §33)
Thus, we obtain the following argument, which I will call argument C:
(Pr 1) All complete episode of linguistic activity constitutes an action, and is
meaningful insofar as this action is performed in accordance with
conventional, ought-to-do rules.
(Pr 2) There are thoughts –conceptual episodes– which are not actions, namely
perceptual takings, inferences, and volitions.
(C) There are thoughts and, therefore, a level of conceptualization which are
no linguistic activity and, a fortiori, are not governed by linguistic rules.
A corollary of this argument is that linguistic activity, understood as a repertoire of
actions, consists in the expression, under ought-to-do rules, of nonlinguistic conceptual
episodes. Again, when Sellars sketches this line of thought, Grice’s strategy resounds
between the lines:
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If all linguistic episodes were actions, then all conceptually meaningful non-actions would
have to be non-linguistic and, hence, thoughts in something like the Cartesian sense. It
would be at this non-linguistic level that the thinking would occur by virtue of which
linguistic activity could realize intentions and constitute a domain of actions. It is but a
step from this to construing languages as essentially an instrument for ‘expressing
thoughts’ –when one is being candid– and, in general, for leading others to believe that
one believes that-p (or intends that-p), and perhaps intends that they believe that one
intends that they so believe, etc. (MFC, p. 420f; RM, p. 122) 
Let’s summarize the main Gricean themes to which Sellars addresses critical
attention: a view of mental intentionality as prior to the meaning of linguistic episodes;
a relational conception of that intentionality; an insistence in language as an instrument
for the expression and communication of previously contentful psychological states.
These themes are interwoven in what, in §I, I called Grice’s «intentional motif». We
have seen that Sellars promotes an alternative program that renders language as
essentially the medium of thought and conceptualization. He accordingly considers the
semantic categories which apply directly to language as the primary locus of
intentionality. In the next section I will finish the outline of this program, and derive
from it the idea of a basic linguistic episode that could arguably rival the Gricean notion
of saying. The success of the whole proposal depends on the plausibility of offering a
nonrelational analysis of the meaning of those episodes.
III
Sellars’ program involves characterizing a basic stratum of rule-governed linguistic
behavior which, not consisting in the performance of actions, could be taken, at the same
time, to be conceptual activity. Episodes of this form of behavior are, on the one hand,
the way of access to language, and on the other, constitute those thoughts referred in the
second premise of the argument C. By accounting for these thoughts in terms of rule-
governed linguistic episodes, the step to conclusion (C) gets blocked. And, indeed, the
relevant behavior is patterned in accordance with three kinds of ought-to-be rules, which
correspond to the three kinds of thoughts –perceptual takings, inferences, and volitions–
that Sellars mentions in passage [2]. The first kind of rules concerns «language entry
transitions», by ensuring that «[t]he speaker responds, ceteris paribus, to objects in
perceptual situations […] with appropriate linguistic activity» (MFC, p. 423). There are,
secondly, rules governing «intralinguistic transitions», that is, both material and formal
inferential patterns. Yet a third group of rules accounts for volitions, by specifying
«language departure transitions» in virtue of which «[t]he speaker responds, ceteris
paribus, to such linguistic episodes as ‘I will now raise my hand’ with an upward motion
of the hand, etc.» (LTC, p. 424). The semantic rules of a language are ought-to-bes
defining these three types of transitions.
It must be remarked that this pattern-governed behavior constitutes the basic level of
both conceptualization and meaning. At this level, the practitioners think without
performing proper actions, and those thoughts amount to linguistic utterances:
«‘thinking that-p’ is, in its most episodic sense, to be equated with ‘candid and
spontaneously uttering ‘p’’.» (LTC, p. 516) For this reason, Sellars calls the episodes
involved in this form of behavior «thinkings-out-loud». Thus, he claims, on the one
4 Liñán:Anthony Bonner  11/04/16  10:44  Página 47
48
hand, that «thinking that-p is, in its primary episodic sense, thinking-out-loud that-p»
(LTC, p. 517), and on the other hand, that «thinking-out-loud is a form of meaningful
speech which doesn’t consist in talking to anyone at all» (LTC, p. 518). Such episodes
are just the realization or actualization of a pattern-governed behavior.
Certainly, during the learning process, we can suppose the child to develop the ability
to inhibit voluntarily the verbal flow associated to this kind of episodes (LTC, p. 522),
thereby acquiring the ability to «think quietly». As the child becomes familiar with
concepts relative to different types of actions, it will eventually acquire the ability to
perform linguistic actions proper, genuine speech acts. However, and this is important,
thinking-out-loud –as a form of behavior patterned according to semantic rules– is not a
mere developmental stage in the learning of language, which adult speakers could
dispense with when they access to the domain of actions; quite the opposite, it gets
established as the rock-bottom conceptual stratum that remains active in full-fledged
speakers and sustain their other linguistic and conceptual activities. The next passages
make it clear:
‘Thinking out loud’ remains the primary form in which thinking occurs. (LTC, p. 522)
It is essential to note that not only are the abilities to engage in such thinking-out-loud
acquired as pattern-governed activity, they remain pattern-governed activity. The
linguistic activities which are perceptual takings, inferences and volitions never become
obeying of ought to do rules. (MFC, p. 424)
It is the pattern-governed activities of perception, inference and volition, themselves
essentially non-actions, which underlie and make possible the domain of action, linguistic
and nonlinguistic. (MFC, p. 425; cf. nAO, V, §11)
In addition, Sellars claims that this basic kind of linguistic activity has intrinsic
intentionality: «verbal behavior as thinking-out-loud has intrinsic intentionality» (nAO,
V, §23).
I now arrive to the core of my proposal. In terms of this variety of episodes, a basic
notion of saying can be introduced, according to which «saying ‘p’» consists in
«candidly and spontaneously uttering ‘p’», and amounts to «thinking-out-loud that-p».
Sellars puts forward this strategy in MFC: «thinking ‘that-p’, where this means ‘having
the thought occur to one that-p’ has its primary sense saying ‘p’» (MFC, p. 418f). Few
lines below, Sellars distinguishes this sense of “saying” from the sense that animates the
paradigm of action:
In any ordinary sense, of course, saying ‘p’ is an action or performance. […] [T]o
characterize an utterance as a ‘saying’, as the verb ‘to say’ is ordinarily used, permit it to
be either a spontaneous thinking-out-loud that-p or a deliberate use of words to achieve a
purpose. Here, on the other hand, the verb ‘to say’ is being use in a contrived sense in
which these options are closed, and the utterance specifically construed as a spontaneous
or candid thinking out loud. (MFC, p. 419f) 
By calling it «contrived», Sellars recognizes that his notion of saying is to some
extent idealized. It should be recalled, however, that also Grice (1989, p. 118) saw his
privileged notion of saying as «in some degree artificial». Hereafter, I will apply the
subscripts ‘
S
’ and ‘
G
’ to the notions of saying –and related notions– favored respectively
by Sellars and Grice.
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The Sellarian notion of saying
S
gives rise to an analysis of the basic cases of
significance which is alternative to Grice’s. In particular, Sellars (LTC, p. 522) favors
the following formulation of the analisandum of «means»:
[M
S
] Jones’ utterance of ‘p’ means p.
[M
S
] contrasts with the analisandum proposed by Grice’s analysis, which
corresponds to an instrumental view of utterances:
[M
g
] By uttering ‘p’, Jones means (to convey) that ___.
Sellars rejects the Gricean formulation, where the sense of ‘means’ «is closely
related to ‘intends’» (LTC, p. 523). Instead, statement [M
S
] does not imply the
performance of any action by Jones. nor does it involve, according to Sellars, any
mysterious relation of aboutness between the utterance of ‘p’ and its meaning, p.
In fact, [M
S
] receives the same style of nonrelational analysis that Sellars provides for
general means-statements as, for instance,
‘Und’ (in German) means and;
‘Rot’ (in German) means red;
‘Es regnet’ (in German) means it’s raining.
On Sellars’s view, these statements do not assert a relation, and in them ‘means’ does
not count as a predicate. What these statements assert is, rather, a peculiar identity
between the quoted expression and the right-hand expression, where ‘means’ operates as
“a specialized form of copula” (MFC, p. 431). The identity involved is functional in
character: each expression in the object-language –in these examples German– is
claimed to play the same function as the metalanguage expression in the three types of
transitions (language-entry, intralinguistic, and language-exit) that Sellars takes as
constitutive of conceptual behavior. In other words, in the linguistic-conceptual behavior
of German speakers, utterances of ‘Es regnet’ do (roughly) the same work with respect
to the three types of relevant transitions as utterances of ‘It’s raining’ do in the
conceptual behavior of English speakers.
Thus, means-statements are attributive statements that assign functional roles to
linguistic expressions. Sellars employs an original device, dot-quotation, to indicate this
point formally. Dot-quoted expressions are taken to illustrate, on the right-hand side of
means-statements, the functional role which is been attributed to left-hand simple-
quoted expressions. In this light, the examples above can be rewritten as:
‘Und’s (in German) are ·and·s;
‘Rot’s (in German) are ·red·s;
‘Es regnet’s (in German) are ·It’s raining·s,
where the dot-quoted expressions are sortal predicates which designate functional roles.
In sum, according to Sellars,
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[T]o say what an expression means is to classify it by the use of a sortal predicate the
application of which implies that the expression in question does the job in its language
which is done in the speaker’s language by an expression from which the predicate is
formed. (LTC, p. 526f)
Likewise, [M
S
] may be reformulated as:
[M
S
’] Jones’ utterances
S
of ‘p’ are ·p·s.
[M
S
’] classifies Jones’ relevant utterances by assigning the functional role illustrated
by ·p· to them. As Sellars claims, «verbal behavior is already thinking in its own right,
and its intentionality or aboutness is simply the appropriateness of classifying it in terms
which relate to the linguistic behavior of the group to which one belongs» (LTC, p. 527).
Consequently, what a speaker, or rather his or her utterance says
S
is exactly what can be
identified in terms of meaning-functional classification. «To say what a person says, or,
more generally, to say what an utterance says, is to give a functional classification of the
utterance.» (MFC, p. 421)
The last step in my argument is to show that the Sellarsian notion of saying
S
can be
thought of as demarcating a central or primary level of meaning, against which other
levels can be constructed. To this effect, I will argue that the episodes of saying
S
, as they
are captured by functional means-statements, have both of the features Grice considers
essential to those central cases of signification which are to provide the basic material
for any philosophical theory of language, and in particular, pragmatic theory.
Firstly, as those episodes of saying
S
do not involve the performance of any proper
action, in saying
S
something the speaker takes no specific attitude towards the semantic
content of the utterance. A fortiori, the speaker cannot mean anything different from
what the utterance means in virtue of the standard functional classification that it
deserves in the speaker’s linguistic community. In particular, since the cases of saying
S
involve candidly and spontaneously uttering, the speakers who are just saying
S
cannot be
taken to suggest, implicate, be sarcastic, or generally keep any other kind of complex
attitude toward what is said
S
. Thus the utterances constituting cases of saying
S
have what
I will call pragmatic zero-grade, which may be associated to the Gricean feature of
dictiveness.
Second, these kind of episodes also have what we can call semantic zero-grade,
insofar as what a speaker says
S
cannot differ from the conventional meaning of the
utterance; this semantic zero-grade incorporates the Gricean feature of formality.
Formality lies here in the conventional association of tokens of a certain type with
certain functional roles. However, this conventionality doesn’t suppose an additional
constraint over previously identifiable cases of saying
S
. The fact that some expressions
hold some sort of conventional meaning is due to the fact that they typically play the
relevant functions in the appropriate transitions. In Sellars’ notion of basic episodes of
conceptual activity, a set of (semantic) rules that we can identify with the conventions
of public language is already implied.
Consequently, an alternative explanatory order to Grice’s results from Sellars’
approach. The status of agent, capable of having intentions, beliefs or wishes, or capable
of undertaking speech acts such as suggesting, promising or implicating, presupposes the
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status of thinker that makes meaningful utterances, whose conceptual content is social
from the very beginning. This approach opens up a space for a normative and social
model of conceptual life, which is also an account of linguistic conventions. This way,
Sellars’ views on intentionality can provide raw materials for a pragmatist alternative to
Grice’s pragmatics (cf. Beisicker, forthcoming).
In fact, we can glimpse a developmental account of the transition from the Sellarsian
ability to say
S
, to the ability to undertake the kind of action which is defined by the
Gricean notion of  saying
g
—from the condition of subjects (patients) of rules of
criticism, to the condition of subjects (agents) of corresponding rules of action. As
Sellars remarks, “the members of a linguistic community […] start out by being the
subject-matters of the ought-to-be’s and graduate to the status of agent subjects of the
ought-to-do’s” (LTC, p. 512). Or, in another context:
The language learner begins by conforming to these rules without grasping them
himself. Only subsequently does the language learner become a full-fledged member of
the linguistic community. (nAO, IV, §25)
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